220 thinking. The second is that classroom discussions involve regular switches between authoritative and dialogic discourse, for example by first explaining a concept or theory, then reflecting on this together, and ultimately returning to the theory again. The toing-and-froing works both ways. The third is that it is not always clear whether discourse is authoritative or dialogic. This is not necessarily a problem, except when it is not clear to pupils what kind of question they are being asked: one to which there is one single right answer, or one that allows for various answers. The fourth research question (beyond the areas-of-tension structure) involved making a list of the strategies that philosophy teachers apply to get their pupils thinking. In the lessons that were observed, teachers got their pupils thinking by asking them questions and getting them to formulate questions as well, by making their pupils ‘co-owners of the dialogue’ (by discussing examples that the pupils had come up with, for example, rather than imposing examples as the teacher), by getting pupils to adopt a position or viewpoint and to ask them to substantiate this with arguments, with the teacher then putting forward an argument that was not suggested by the pupils. From the perspective of the three areas of tension it is easy to understand why teacher-led dialogue is so popular in philosophy education. It allows the middle ground between the opposites in all three of the areas of tension to be held, a sort of balancing act. By switching between authoritative and dialogic discourse, teachers can target specific philosophical concepts and theories (learning philosophy) as well as get the pupils to think about (or reflect on) them (doing philosophy). This therefore leaves room for continuity (covering the curriculum) as well as for discontinuity (improvising and making use of whatever opportunities present themselves). This goes for the definition of concepts as well: it too involves a balancing act in all three areas of tension. On the one hand, this is necessary because pupils can only reflect on concepts if they know what these concepts mean, while, of the other hand, defining these concepts limits the room pupils have to reflect on these topics themselves. In conclusion, five recommendations are made. The first of these relates to the use of the analytical framework. The analytical framework should not be seen to imply that a good philosophy lesson will always straddle the exact middle ground between the opposites of the areas of tension, or that a good philosophy teacher must always occupy the exact middle ground as far as their views on this are concerned. It is meant as a framework that philosophy teachers can make use of as they reflect on their teaching practice.
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