Proefschrift

118 5 CHAPTER 5 to structure the process) or one-on-one sessions with experts. This qualitative evaluation should preferably be conducted by independent researcher that was not involved in this research for a critical review of the model. CPNs have been used for over forty years to model different processes in different application domains such as manufacturing, computer networks and even a NORAD1 command post (Shapiro, Pinci, & Mameli, 1993). Our simulation is applied to a very specific use case - that of military surveillance drones - and it is not clear if it will also be applicable to other autonomous systems as well. This is one of the limitations of our research (see section 7.2). In further research the CPNs should be extended to other scenarios of autonomous systems in the military domain in order to check if the CPN approach is scalable and can be extended to a broadly used tool for oversight of autonomous systems. 5.4 CONCLUSION The simulation of the implementation concept shows that it is possible to set criteria in the pre-flight process and to evaluate these criteria post-flight. During flight, the drone itself is treated as a black box of which the internal logic is not accessible. Although being a toy example, it demonstrates that a monitoring process can be designed to implement human oversight where the users set norms- or criteria in this example- for input and observe and evaluate the output against the input to check for noncompliance of the norms. Deviations of the norms will be reported in the verification process and can be used to update the norms in a new scenario. This way the users do not need technical skills to understand the internal workings of drone, but still can monitor and oversee the use of the autonomous system based on observable norms. We do not monitor the in-flight actions of the autonomous drone in our implementation concept, because we assume that in-flight communication is not possible, for example due to a failing communication structure, an Electronic Warfare Threat, or operator unpreparedness. Therefore, it is not possible to oversee norm violations nor is it possible to intervene during the flight as would often be the case with black box autonomous systems. 1 NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense

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