Proefschrift

60 2 CHAPTER 2 take steps as necessary to alter or replace processes that no longer seem likely to bring about X.’ (Goodin, 1995, p. 83). Supervision has to be done by the agent and cannot be delegated. Oversight over international institutions can be used as an equivalent for the accountability of these institutions according to De Wet (2008). She distinguishes three forms of oversight: (1) vertical oversight in which there is a hierarchy between institutions and the parent organ can exercise formal control over and issue sanctions to the child organ, (2) horizontal oversight which is not based on a hierarchical supervisory organ but often is on voluntarily or based on a constitutive document and sanctioning is mostly restricted to social pressure or public naming-and-shaming, and (3) intermediate oversight, which lies in between vertical and horizontal oversight and has a formal basis in a constitutive document but is supervised by a non-hierarchical institution which often acts and reports to a body higher up in hierarchy and sanctions vary in severity. 2.13 CONCLUSION Ethical concerns on Autonomous Weapon Systems call for a process of human oversight to ensure accountability over targeting decisions and the use of force. Responsibility, accountability and Meaningful Human Control are values often mentioned in the societal and academic debate. Ongoing control or direct control (Busuioc, 2007) by an (human) agent is not possible in case of executive autonomy because the notion of executive autonomy described by Castelfranchi and Falcone (2003) has implications for the applicability of (military) control instruments for Autonomous Weapon Systems. Bovens (2007) notes that accountability can be viewed as a form of control, but not all forms of control are accountability mechanisms. Similarly, Meaningful Human Control, at least in Santoni de Sio and Van den Hoven (2018) perspective, not always requires more traditional forms of technical control such as direct power of a human controller, or a competent human operator having a constant and meaningful interaction with the technical system, even though these may sometimes be needed. But accountability always requires strong mechanisms in order to oversee, discuss and verify the behaviour of the system to check if its behaviour is aligned with human values and norms. Therefore, based on the literature review above, we propose a Framework for Comprehensive Human Oversight that connects the engineering, socio-technical and governance perspective of control. By this we broaden the view on the control over Autonomous Weapon Systems and take a comprehensive approach that goes beyond the notions of control described above. In the next chapter, the Comprehensive Human Oversight Framework is elucidated and applied to the military domain.

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