70 3 CHAPTER 3 Contrary to the analysis of the academic literature describing the control mechanisms in the governance, socio-technical and technical perspective in Figure 7, the military domain has an oversight mechanism during deployment in block 2 (see Figure 8). The targeting process in block 2 is a decision-making process for methodical planning of actions to counter opponents in order to achieve the effect in the strategic and operational campaign plan (NATO, 2016). The targeting process is a domain specific process for the military and is not monitored by an independent institution. By this, it is comparable to the statement of Pesch (2015) that an institutional structure for engineers is lacking to call on them to recognize, reflect upon and actively integrate values into the designs on a structural basis. Like engineers, the military does not have an independent institutional structure to call on them to reflect upon their values and principles during deployment. Reflection is done within the military domain and if military personnel violate military law and regulations they have to account for their conduct at a military court. However, this accountability process will be conducted after deployment and is not part of the targeting process during deployment. The military control instruments in Figure 8 are connected in the vertical columns of the layers. For example, the Rules-of-Engagement (block 4) will be based upon the Mission Mandate (block 1) and the options for weapon control status setting (block 7) will be determined by the Rules of Engagement (block 4). This is also the case for the horizontal levels as the Rules of Engagement (block 4) determine the guidelines of the Forward Air Control (block 5) and the After Action Report (block 6). This also applies to the bottomup process after deployment. The Battle Damage Assessment (block 9) will be input for the After Action Report (block 6). The After Action Reports (block 6) should be used in the Post Mission Review process (block 3). The feedback loop in the governance level from the Post Mission Review process (block 3) to the Mission Mandate (block 1) is often not conducted. A reason for this might be that different institutions are responsible for these instruments. The UN or NATO will draft the Mission Mandate and the Post Mission Review process is a national instrument. It is difficult to embed a national perspective in a multilateral document. In the socio-technical and technical level this feedback loop is conducted more often as these are within the military sphere of influence. For example, the Rules of Engagement (block 4) can be adjusted based on the findings of After Action Reports (block 6) and the Forward Air Control procedures (block 3) can be changed in accordance with the Rules Of Engagement (block 4). We recommend to try to close the feedback loop in the governance level so that findings in the Post Mission Review process will feed back into the Mission Mandate.
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