Proefschrift

73 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Systems to control these specific actions that the Autonomous Weapon System takes to achieve its goal, because executive autonomy inherently implies that the main subject (x) (i.e. the Autonomous Weapon System) is autonomous in setting its means (i.e. actions) to achieve its goal (μ) independently from secondary subject (γ) (i.e. the human operator). Partially Autonomous Weapon Systems may be designed to respond to the input of operators or controller, but given the complexity and speed of these systems, it is an open question to what extent and under which conditions operators and controllers would be able to effectively supervise and intervene (see section 2.11 on Meaningful Human Control). iii. In the governance layer an independent mechanism to monitor these actions of the Autonomous Weapon System is missing in the current Comprehensive Human Oversight Framework (see Figure 9). c. After deployment of an Autonomous Weapon System, i. The output of weapon deployment in the technical layer is the destruction of a target in order to achieve a military effect and the output will be verified by a Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), ii. There is an ex-post control mechanism to account for the weapon deployment in socio-technical layer, being the After Action Report (AAR) process. iii. The ex post review in the governance layer could be done to evaluate the mission in a post mission review process and takes the Rules of Engagement and number of weapon deployments into account. The current military control mechanisms described above are sufficient to bound the area of operation, the duration of the operation and deployment of weapons. But the introduction of autonomy in Autonomous Weapon Systems has implications on the military control mechanisms, mainly in the socio-technical layer during deployment of an Autonomous Weapon System. This may require reformation of the military control instruments. These implications might lead to new training methods for military personnel for them to have the capacity (knowledge and skills) to responsibly deploy these weapons, but might also lead to new institutions and design methods, for example Value-Sensitive Design in (military) engineering (Santoni de Sio & Van den Hoven, 2018), as control mechanisms in the governance layer. Comparing the Comprehensive Human Oversight Framework in Figure 7 to that of Autonomous Weapon Systems in Figure 9 reveals two gaps in the control mechanisms that can be linked to the accountability gaps in section 2.9: (1) a mechanism in block 2 of an independent institution that ensures oversight of a weapon during deployment (a governance accountability gap), and (2) in the Comprehensive Human Oversight

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