131 4 Discussion This study shows that besides stereotyping, projection and perceived similarity play a role in shaping the expectations voters have of Muslim politicians. Most voters either strongly agree or disagree with same-sex adoption, with only a minority of voters having in-between positions. Pro- and anti-flankers seem to project their opinion onto politicians. Indeed, voters who are most vehemently pro- and anti-same-sex adoption tend to expect politicians to share their position irrespective of whether the politician is Muslim or non-religious. Moderates, however, tend to stereotype Muslim politicians. Amongst pro-flankers, perceived similarity towards Muslims is highest and has a significant positive relationship with expecting Muslim politicians to be in favor of same-sex adoption. The assumption of party gatekeepers that stereotypes about Muslim politicians could be an electoral liability due to views on homosexuality turns out to be true only for these voters who have lukewarm feelings about same-sex adoption. Without considering whether the potential supporters of a political party perceive themselves as similar to Muslims while also being in favor of issues for which Muslims are most often criticized such as acceptance of homosexuality, gender equality and freedom of speech, flawed assumptions may be driving the “sober electoral calculations” (Dancygier, 2017: 70) of party gatekeepers. The group with the most egalitarian worldviews on same-sex adoption and highest perceived similarity to Muslims turned out to be quite large, at 44 percent, and tends not to have stereotyped expectations of Muslim politicians. Voters with moderately egalitarian views on same-sex adoption (43 percent) did, however, stereotype Muslim politicians. Like their fellow flankers, those most opposed to same-sex adoption (thirteen percent) also tended to project their own ideas onto politicians, be they Muslim or non-religious. If “sober electoral calculations” are to be made, party gatekeepers need to consider how similar their voters perceive themselves to be towards people who practice Islam and that those who are most in favor of homosexuality can also perceive themselves to be most similar towards Muslims. If party gatekeepers expect their electorate to perceive themselves as more similar to Muslims than others and in favor of homosexuality, fear of electoral backlash due to stereotyped expectations of Muslim politicians is likely misplaced. This does not mean that the inclusion of Muslim politicians on political party lists will not foment backlash. Islamophobic backlash can take many different forms, be it homonationalist, femonationalist (Farris, 2017; Rahbari, 2021), secular nativist (Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019) or civiliationist (Brubaker, 2017). Femonationalism posits Muslim men as dangerous (Frey, 2020; Yurdakul and Korteweg, 2021) and Muslim women as victims of Muslim men (Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2021). Despite strong resistance to these narratives by Muslim citizens (van Es, 2019), femonationalist narratives are
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