135 4 base to build broader electoral coalitions. Thanks to their “greater incentives to pay attention” (Wolak and Juenke, 2019: 18), the voters they descriptively represent are more likely to be familiar with such rhetoric (Akachar, 2018; Akachar et al., 2017; Stephens-Dougan, 2020: 9, 15, 19). Nor are such “betrayals” punished harshly enough to nullify the electoral gains among racial moderates (Stephens-Dougan, 2020: 9, 15, 19). In any case, there is very limited empirical data on how these practices influence perceptions of Muslim politicians among Muslim voters (Dancygier, 2017: 179) – a key lacuna for future research. The practices of political exclusion, Islamophobia, symbolic inclusion, religious distancing and suppressive representation give rise to different interpretations of why voters who are most accepting of homosexuality and tend to perceive Muslims as similar apparently project their own ideas onto politicians. Besides projection and perceived similarity, these voters may be counter-stereotyping Muslim politicians as well. Those voters who are most accepting of homosexuality are also likely to be: 1) most aware of how Islamophobia is justified through homonationalism and keen to emphasize the diversity of views within Muslim communities; 2) committed to equal representation and diversity in politics; and 3) aware of the practices of symbolic inclusion and religious distancing. All of the above might lead voters with the most egalitarian worldviews to counter-stereotype Muslim politicians alongside projecting their views onto politicians with perceived similarity as either a cause or consequence. A priority for future research is to disentangle stances towards perceived similarity, Islamophobic injustice, commitment to diversity, and knowledge of symbolic inclusion and religious distancing, possibly leading to the counter-stereotyping of Muslim politicians among certain subsets of voters.
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