22 Introduction Many believe that minority voters tend to vote for in-group politicians, who, in turn, will represent their interests (Dancygier, 2017; Stephens-Dougan, 2020). Even when reality is much more complicated, this in-group voting assumption fundamentally shapes the dynamics underlying narratives on diversity in political representation (idem): this assumption perpetuates a view that paints minority politicians as being “beholden” to their group’s interests at the cost of the majority, stemming from a zerosum worldview often prevalent among members of the majority group (StephensDougan, 2020). This assumes minority voters simply vote for their in-group. I argue this portrays minorities as lacking rationality in forming their own democratic choices, thereby not taking their thoughtful participation in the democratic process seriously. Consequently, minority politicians, assumed to have gained office through the support of in-group voters, have their electoral accomplishments attributed to merely their group membership, overlooking their views and efforts. Reality is, however, much more complicated than the in-group voting assumption might suggest. In many political contexts, minority politicians are incentivized to broaden their electoral appeal by distancing themselves from their in-group, a phenomenon I call minority broadstancing (van Oosten, 2024). The most famous example of a minority broadstancer is probably Barack Obama (Stephens-Dougan, 2020). For instance, he famously called for Black people to “get off the couch” (2020: 67), distancing himself from Black stereotypes of laziness, and blaming racism for their problems (idem). These stereotypical remarks are electorally beneficial: white moderates might be persuaded Barack Obama is not a threat to the racial status quo, thus broadening his electoral appeal (idem). Broadstancing can range from the distancing from stereotypes in the case of Obama, to “suppressive representation:” when minority politicians adopt suppressive positions towards the cultural and/or religious rights and freedoms of their in-group (Aydemir and Vliegenthart, 2016). Nonetheless, the in-group voting assumption remains ubiquitous (StephensDougan, 2020). The consequences of the perpetuation of the in-group voting assumption undermines minority politicians’ legitimacy and disrupts the functioning of our pluralistic democracy by hindering equal representation. Meanwhile, it perpetuates and originates from a power hierarchy that places the majority at the center and the minorities at the periphery. Understanding the dynamic relationship between minority voters and their in-group politicians is crucial, because it exerts a firm grip on the representation of minorities. The examination of this relationship from the perspective of the minority politician has been well executed (Aydemir and Vliegenthart, 2016; Dancygier, 2017; Stephens-Dougan, 2020), and now I am completing the puzzle from the viewpoint of the minority voter. Hence, the central research question is: Who prefers politicians with whom they share the same religion, migration background
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