85 2 Lastly, it is important to note that conjoint experiments only provide a snapshot of voters’ initial impressions, and real-life campaigns may further shape their perceptions and thus voting behavior. Nevertheless, this research contributes to our understanding of Social Identity Theory and political representation. These findings support Social Identity Theory’s assertion that in-group favoritism is more likely to occur in high-status groups than in low-status groups, contradicting popular notions that suggest otherwise (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 36). I argue that voters with a migration background aligning themselves with high-status out-groups reflects a “social mobility belief system,” as described by Social Identity Theory (Haslam, 2001: 25). This belief system implies that group boundaries are permeable, and individuals can attain mobility and access high-status groups. As a result, voters with a migration background tend to reject politicians who share the same low-status group membership and instead prefer those with French, German, and Dutch backgrounds. According to Social Identity Theory, the in-group favoritism amongst Muslims, particularly in the Netherlands, points more towards evidence of a “social change belief system” in which group boundaries are perceived as impermeable (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In situations where Muslim voters prefer their in-group and challenge the outgroup’s superiority (as apparent in the results from the Netherlands), this reflects the perception of impermeable group boundaries and insecure relations. They understand themselves as fixed within their religious category and reject the legitimacy of the status difference, leading to social competition. In cases where Muslim voters prefer their ingroup without challenging the out-group’s superiority (as in France and Germany), this reflects the perception of impermeable group boundaries and secure relations. They accept the status difference between Muslims and non-religious citizens as legitimate and stable. A reason for this difference between France and Germany on the one hand and the Netherlands on the other, could be that the Netherlands has historically seen comparatively high levels of Muslim representation (Hughes, 2016), there is a political party in the Netherlands that consists of Muslim parliamentarians from Turkey and Morocco who advocate for Muslim rights, “DENK” (Otjes and Krouwel, 2019; Vermeulen et al., 2020) and Muslim voters in the Netherlands are, therefore, more accustomed to Muslim politicians with whom they share the same policy positions. While I deduce from Social Identity Theory that Muslim voters tend to view group boundaries as impermeable, non-religious voters may be more inclined to see religion as a matter of personal choice, resulting in perceived highly permeable group boundaries that reflect a “social mobility belief system” (Haslam, 2001: 26). The wording of the experiment, particularly phrases such as “practices Islam” or “does not practice any religion,” may have contributed to this perspective. If non-religious voters see religion as a choice, any Muslim could opt to stop “practicing Islam” and thereby “choose individual mobility.” Not “choosing” for mobility could be seen as evidence of the “out-group’s inferiority” (Haslam, 2001: 26), expressed through non-
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjY0ODMw